Research

Abstract: Standard matching theory assumes students have complete strict preferences, yet empirical evidence documents substantial rates of incomplete preferences in various choice contexts including school choice mechanisms. This paper provides the first experiment on extensions of Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms with incomplete preferences. Three key findings emerge. First, DA elicits higher overall consistent reporting rates than TTC driven by subjects with complete preferences, while subjects with incomplete preferences maintain high consistency under both mechanisms. Second, individual consistent reporting has a strong influence on determining welfare outcomes though the mechanisms are not strategyproof, generating more efficient and fair assignments. Third, students with incomplete preferences could benefit their peers: complete-preference students achieve higher exchange-proof assignment rates in mixed groups than in groups composed entirely of complete-preference students. These findings suggest that accommodating incomplete preferences in matching mechanisms can enhance welfare outcomes for all participants.

Abstract: This paper estimates the effect of DMV information provision on organ transplantation from deceased donors. Exploiting the staggered adoption of information provision policies across states from the 1980s through 2010s, I find that providing written educational materials during driver’s license applicants and renewals increases transplants by 14-35% per zip code-year. Treatment effects grow over time: modest impacts in the first two years (11% increase) strengthen to 29-35% increases by years 11-15, consistent with cumulative exposure through repeated license renewals. I find no evidence of cross-state spillover effects. These findings demonstrate that DMV information provision can increase organ transplantation rate for in-state patients.

Abstract: This study investigates how the origin of shared resources in social dilemma games influences individual behavior. By distinguishing between endogenous resources, created through deliberate collective action, and exogenous resources, existing independently of participants’ choices, we explore how these origins impact decision-making. We construct a novel two-stage social dilemma game to determine whether the origination of a shared resource impacts the choice to further contribute or exploit. The game combines a traditional public goods provision game with a subsequent mixed game played over the newly established public account balance. We also construct a between-subjects triadic design to determine whether decisions are consistent with trust, reciprocity, or unconditional other-regarding preferences. Our results support the conclusion that resource origins matter, as subjects behave less cooperatively when group account balances are endogenously low. We also find that 50% of subjects have conditional other-regarding preferences when group account balances are exogenous.